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ABSTRACT: 
 Using the tragic-heroic archetypes of Achilles and Hamlet, this 
paper examines the nature of choice in the real and imagined lives of 
two individuals living in Nazi-and-Soviet-occupied East-Central Europe:  
Maciek, a fictional character in Andrzej Wajda’s celebrated post-war film 
Ashes and Diamonds, and Rudi, an historical person examined in Andrew 
Stuart Bergerson and Maria Stehle’s  “Rudoph Mosaner’s ‘Wanderjahre.’”  
An interdisciplinary, comparative analysis of these dramatic figures yields 
insights into the nature of human agency and the necessity of choice, 
especially in vital situations.  Ultimately, for human agents, acceptance 
or refusal of choice itself may be equally important to particular decisions 
between two or more morally weighted options.
 Philosophy, one will recall, literally means a love of wisdom.  
Wisdom, of course, is not the acquisition of information for its own sake, 
but knowledge in action—knowledge applied.  In other words, wisdom is 
intimately related to choice.  While philosophers since Plato have often 
reflected on choice, they have not been content to merely develop 
procedures for arriving at the best of two or more options.  They have also 
insisted on the importance of examining the nature of choice itself.  While 
what (content) and how (method) are irreducible considerations of a 
problem for all human agents, equally important is the question of why—
why choose at all?  Illustrating the problem of agency through tragedy, 
philosophers and dramatists have bequeathed to us a wisdom that insists 
on the necessity of choice.  The personal successes and failures of tragic 
heroes like Achilles and Hamlet, as well as real historical persons closer to 
our own time, are replete with lessons concerning choice.  Drawing from 
both art and life, this paper will use the traditions of philosophy and tragedy 
to examine the nature of choice in a modern context.  Through 
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interdisciplinary lenses, I will show how issues of choice connect  
literary figures like Achilles and Hamlet to the 1958 classic Polish film,  
Ashes and Diamonds, and Andrew Stuart Bergerson and Maria Stehle’s  
historical article about a German soldier during World War II, “Rudoph  
Mosaner’s ‘Wanderjahre.’”1  Critical reflection and comparison of these 
narratives will demonstrates that refusing choice condemns one to an  
undignified end and a fate worse than death.
 In a lecture given in 2005 and later republished as Philosophy in  
the Present, French philosopher Alain Badiou insists that philosophy  
cannot have something to say about every problem.  Because a philosopher 
is someone who decides what important problems are or invents new  
problems, a philosopher cannot be asked “on television, night after night, 
what he thinks about what’s going on.”2 In other words, only problems 
with particular features provide a situation for philosophical intervention.  
For example, a philosopher might find a situation worthy of reflection or 
examination if the situation elucidates a choice. Badiou illustrates such a 
situation by retelling the argument between Socrates and Callicles in Plato’s 
Gorgias. In this dialogue, “the thought of Socrates and that of Callicles share 
no common measure, they are totally foreign to one another.”3 On one hand, 
Callicles argues that “might is right,” that justice is “cunning and  
violence” and that “the happy man is a tyrant.” On the other, Socrates ar-
gues that the happy man is the virtuous man, the “true man” and “the Just.”4 
Badiou argues that between the two lines of thought, “justice as  
violence” and “justice as thought,” there is no common relation. Thus  
Plato’s dialogue presents not a discussion, but a confrontation.  And faced 
with this situation, the task of philosophy “is to show that we must choose.”5 
 Tragedy also emphasizes the necessity of choice, even if human 
freedom seems limited when confronted with fate.  Over time tragedians 
have developed two tragic-heroic types—those who fail because of a  
mistaken choice but retain their dignity, and those who fail because of 
indecision and are condemned to an unsympathetic end.  In the Greek 
tradition, Achilles represents this former kind of hero.  During a particularly 
intimate scene in the Iliad, Achilles refuses to fight the Trojans because he 
has been publicly dishonored by one of his allies, the Greek warrior-king 
Agamemnon.  Idle in camp, the usually fierce Achilles shows a rare moment 
of existential contemplation and vulnerability.  He reflects that there is little 
glory in war and that death in combat is senseless.  Although sincere,  
Achilles’ doubts are short lived.  Even though his death was predicted both 
by oracles and by his enemy, Hector, Achilles refuses to return to his home-
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land where he foresees living into old age. After the death of his best friend 
Patroclus, a newly ennobled Achilles returns to battle and defeats Hector 
and the Trojans, winning great glory. While the Iliad does not 
recount Achilles’ death, Greek tradition holds that he was later killed by 
Paris, which establishes Achilles as a tragic hero.  Juxtaposed with his 
ultimate fate, an early death, Achilles’ earlier moment of introspection 
and doubt evidences his agency. Confronted with a difficult fate, Achilles 
chooses a path of courage and glory—important virtues of the Greeks—
and is thusly remembered.
 The most famous tragic hero of the latter category—the tragic hero  
embodied by one who fails to choose—is not from Greek but rather  
Shakespearean tragedy.  This is Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, the angst- 
ridden protagonist of the play that bears his name.  Faced with the  
knowledge that his father has been murdered by his uncle, Hamlet  
becomes erratic, melancholic, and indecisive.  He toys with his lover, 
Ophelia, sometimes approaching her with tenderness, and other times with 
rage.  In one scene he famously screams for her to leave: “Get thee to a  
nunnery!”6 Eventually he drives her mad and she takes her own life.  Ham-
let’s soliloquies are notoriously ridden with anxiety and indecision:  “to take 
arms against a sea of troubles” or “to die.”7 Ultimately, his downfall is the 
result of his own fence-sitting on whether to avenge his father by killing his 
uncle, Claudius.  Hamlet’s indecisiveness allows for his enemies to conspire 
to kill him, and although he avenges his father’s death, he dies needlessly 
while performing the act, his flesh ripped open by a poisoned rapier.  While 
the deaths of Achilles and Hamlet are both in some ways senseless, Achilles 
is redeemed because of his decisiveness and embodiment of courage in the 
face of fate.  Hamlet’s downfall is unsympathetic—his death by no means 
inevitable and is effectuated primarily because he repeatedly denies his 
own power to choose.
 In many ways, the protagonist Maciek in Andrzej Wajda’s 1958  
film Ashes and Diamonds is analogous to the tragic-heroic archetype  
exemplified by Achilles.  The film is set in a small town in Poland on the 
last day of World War II.  Maciek, a member of the Polish resistance, has 
been given an order to kill a local Communist official named Szczuka.  The 
first assassination attempt is botched when Maciek and his partner  
Andrzej shoot up a car full of cement plant workers they mistake for  
Szczuka’s entourage.  Andrzej, Maciek’s superior officer, then receives  
further orders that Maciek is to finish the job while he himself will be  
transferred elsewhere.  At this point the film takes several detours.   
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Maciek has a brief love affair with Krystyna, the barmaid of the hotel, and 
the relationship gives him pause to consider his occupation.  In a scene 
reminiscent of Achilles’ existential reflection, Maciek expresses doubts 
about his occupation as a soldier to Andrzej, and he asks what they are 
fighting for.  Andrzej coldly replies that Maciek will be considered a  
deserter if he does not kill Szczuka and reminds him of the Polish cause.   
In the end, an emboldened Maciek maintains fidelity to the Polish  
resistance, killing the Communist official in a dark street while fireworks 
erupt commemorating the end of the war against the Nazis.  The film draws 
to a close as Maciek is unexpectedly and senselessly shot by Polish soldiers 
and momentarily wraps himself in a white linen sheet hanging from a 
clothesline.  The image of the blood-soaked cloth evokes the red and white 
of Poland’s flag, cementing Maciek’s status as a hero, if a somewhat ironic 
one.  Like Achilles, Maciek represents a man of action caught in a universe 
of moral confusion and violence.  Unable to escape death, he forgoes the 
chance of love and domestic life for higher virtues and the cause of his  
nation.  The lesson of the tragic hero embodied by Achilles and Maciek is 
that although we may not be able to choose how we die, we have to  
opportunity to choose for what we live.
 To return to Badiou, the narratives of Achilles and Maciek are 
philosophical situations because they present the protagonists with choices 
that bear no relation.  Between the call of love and the call of duty there is 
no common measure.  As agents each must choose and as an audience we 
must also choose.  The importance of these stories lies less in the particu-
lar content of the choices of their protagonists than in the act of choice 
itself.  In other words, one may not agree with Achilles and Maciek and still 
respect that they chose.  The second kind of tragic-hero, Hamlet, however,  
refuses to choose.  He drives his lover mad, causing her to take her own 
life, and then he loses his life himself.  This kind of tragic hero—someone 
who refuses to choose when confronted with a difficult problem—has  
historical counterparts, and can be seen as an archetype of many  
collaborators of genocide and oppression during Nazi and Soviet occupation 
of East-Central Europe during World War II.  Far more prevalent than hard-
line, orthodox followers of Nazi or Stalinist ideology were “non-ideological” 
people who collaborated in oppression or genocide with the occupying 
regimes—in other words, those who chose neither active participation  
nor resistance.
 An historical example of such a person may be found in  
Andrew Stuart Bergerson and Maria Stehle’s article, “Rudoph Mosaner’s  
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‘Wanderjahre.’”  The article recounts the autobiographical testimony of  
Rudolph Mosaner, or Rudi, on his life in Europe during the Nazi occupation. 
The central thesis of Bergerson and Stehle’s work is that Rudi, a soldier in 
the German army, employed irony both during and in the retelling of the 
events of this period of his life to “negotiate complex ethical-political  
postures that preserved a sense of moral distance” from the violence in 
which he was complicit.8 In his testimony, Rudi consistently downplays the 
violence for which he was either complicit, participatory, or a beneficiary.  
In Rudi’s account he breaks rules, mocks his commanders, and depicts 
himself as a “habitual nonconformist and ironic trickster.”9 Rudi himself is 
never at the center of violence.  Consider Rudi’s testimony of a period  
during which he was attached to a motorized unit traveling through  
Belgrade, Budapest, and Croatia.  Although historical evidence suggests his 
unit was involved in violent encounters, Rudi omits description of any  
military engagements whatsoever and claims that “the fighting was  
concluded by the time his unit arrived and that the SS were responsible for 
most of the destruction.”10 Bergerson and Stehle note that such rhetorical  
maneuvering was common in postwar recollections, a “largely untenable 
distinction between the ideologically committed, genocidal SS units and the 
politically indifferent, military minded Wehrmacht.”11 Furthermore,  
Bergerson and Stehle insist that Rudi’s irony was not simply a post-war  
affectation to hide his complicity with Nazism; rather, Rudi used irony to 
survive on a daily basis during the war.  For Rudi, irony was a defense 
mechanism used to obscure his own refusal to choose—neither active 
participation nor active resistance to the Nazis.  Rudi’s ironic posture and 
selective omission of particular historical events in his testimony evidences 
that he felt a sense of guilt over this refusal.  While denial of choice drove 
Hamlet mad, Rudi was able to maintain such denial and his sanity and  
continue living by cultivating a pathology of ethical avoidance with irony 
at its heart—behavior in effort to achieve what Bergerson and Stehle dub a 
form of moral sovereign impunity.  
 All of these characters—Achilles, Hamlet, Maciek and Rudi—were 
trapped in a fatalistic universe.  For each of them death lurked in the 
shadows, around the corner or just over the next hill.  While the fates of 
Achilles and Maciek are lamentable, their acceptance of personal agency 
is commendable.  Not so for Hamlet and Rudi.  Rudi largely fits the Hamlet 
model of tragic hero, except that he did not die, as many did, on a battlefield 
in Europe.  He survived into old age and dies of natural causes.  In a sense, 
this makes Rudi’s fate even more tragic.  Through Rudi’s autobiographical 
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interviews at the end of his life, upon which Bergerson and Stehle’s article 
is based, we witness a demise worse than death in the usual sense.  To 
borrow from another literary tradition, Rudi had become a qelipot, a 
Kabbalistic term which refers to the husks of the dead—the condition of a 
body that goes on after the loss of its soul.  
 Today, many contemporary historians work towards non-ideological 
or non-metaphysical interpretations of history.  Well-intentioned they may 
be, their insistence on neutrality merely obscures various ideologies  
operating just under the surface of their work.  Historians must aim beyond 
the construction of factual narratives.  Drawing from traditions like  
philosophy and tragedy, they must understand the relationship of the 
narratives they construct to the archetypal narratives upon which we 
humans organize our personal identities and social relations.  Truth is 
important, but no less important is truth-effect—history means nothing if 
it does not compel the transformation of life.  
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